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Abstract 
We present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism in the context of the multi-unit 
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deferred acceptance mechanisms and implements the set of stable matchings in 
both Nash and undominated Nash equilibria under substitutable priorities. In 
addition, we prove that under slot-specific priorities, the immediate acceptance 
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1 Introduction
We are interested in multi-unit assignment problems for which multiple ob-
jects are assigned to agents on the basis of priorities. This is the case, for
example, of the course allocation problem (see Sönmez and Ünver, 2010; Bud-
ish, 2011; Kojima, 2013). The time scheduling problem or the assignment
of landing slots (see Schummer and Vohra, 2013; Schummer and Abizada,
2017) are also examples of multi-unit assignment problems.
We focus our attention on fair (or stable) allocations. Under multi-unit
demand, no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. Additionally, the
deferred acceptance mechanism can produce unstable matchings as Nash
equilibrium outcomes (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Haeringer and Klijn,
2009). To overcome this diﬃculty, we concentrate on mechanisms that are
able to achieve stable matchings as a result of a strategic interaction. To
achieve this objective, we introduce the renegotiable acceptance mechanism.
Similar to the immediate acceptance mechanism, the renegotiable acceptance
mechanism assigns seats at courses to students who rank them ﬁrst and then
to those who rank them second, and so on.1 However, similar to the deferred
acceptance mechanism, seats are not deﬁnitively assigned to students. The
allocation can be renegotiated, and a student can lose a (tentatively) assigned
course. Our mechanism allows for students to express the intensity of their
1We use the terminology of immediate acceptance introduced in Thomson (2018), but
the many-to-one version of this mechanism is also known as the Boston mechanism (see
Abdulkadiro§lu and Sönmez, 2003) and was ﬁrst analyzed by Alcalde (1996), who calls it
the now-or-never mechanism.
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preferences. By ranking a course higher, a student increases her chances of
being admitted. Therefore, students have incentives to act strategically. The
eﬀects of these manipulations cancel out at equilibrium and the renegotiable
acceptance mechanism is able to implement the set stable matchings in both
Nash equilibrium and undominated Nash equilibrium under substitutable
priorities.
As best as we know, this is the ﬁrst paper to consider substitutable pri-
orities in a course allocation problem (see Marutani, 2018, for the use of
substitutable priorities in the school choice problem). Substitutable priori-
ties account for situations in which admission criteria are slot-speciﬁc (see
Kominers and Sönmez, 2016). These are situations in which a subgroup of
students is given priority for a portion of the seats that are otherwise assigned
according to a given criterion. Slot-speciﬁc priorities allow for the designer,
for example, to introduce diversity in the classroom (see Dur et al. 2016, 2018
for applications to school choice).2 Restricting our attention to slot-speciﬁc
priorities, we show that the immediate acceptance mechanism is able to im-
plement the set stable of matchings in Nash equilibrium and undominated
Nash equilibrium. In situations in which more general substitutable priori-
ties are required, for example, when students are expected to work in teams
of a given size, the immediate acceptance mechanism can result in unstable
matchings. Thus, our results extend to the multi-unit assignment problem
2Slot-speciﬁc priorities also encompass approaches such as majority quotas as deﬁned
in Kojima (2012) and minority reserves introduced by Hafalir et al. (2013).
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the previous implementation results by Alcalde (1996) and Ergin and Sönmez
(2006) for the marriage and school admission problems, respectively.
Finally, note that in the multi-unit assignment problem, describing the
entire preference proﬁle requires listing up to 2n subsets of courses, where
n is the number of courses (see Budish et al., 2017). We show that if stu-
dents' preferences are responsive, then it is possible to simplify the strategy
space.3 We introduce simpliﬁed versions of the renegotiable and immediate
acceptance mechanisms for which students' strategies are the rankings over
individual courses and the maximum number of courses they are willing to
take. Then, we run either the renegotiable acceptance or the immediate ac-
ceptance mechanism with any responsive extension of the submitted proﬁles.
We prove that the simpliﬁed mechanisms preserve the incentive properties of
the full mechanisms.
1.1 Related Literature
Our strategy is to relax the equilibrium requirements from dominant strategy
to Nash equilibrium to implement the set of stable allocations. Two other
approaches have been used to tackle the course allocation problem.
The ﬁrst approach is to insist on implementing stable allocations in dom-
inant strategies and restrict the set of admissible priorities. Kojima (2013)
shows that dominant strategy implementation of stable allocations is possible
3The assumption of responsive preferences is common in the literature on course allo-
cation and is used, among others, in Kojima (2013), Kojima and Ünver (2014), and Dogal
and Klaus (2018).
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if and only if priorities satisfy essential homogeneity. Under essential homo-
geneity, the mechanism required to implement stable allocations is equivalent
to a serial dictatorship in which the order of choice depends on the distribu-
tion of seats among courses. If we require the mechanism to be independent
of the seat distribution, a stable mechanism that makes true preferences a
dominant strategy exists if and only if priorities are acyclical (see Romero-
Medina and Triossi, 2018). Essential homogeneity and acyclicity impose
severe restrictions on the design of priorities. It is worth noting that both
Kojima (2013) and Romero-Medina and Triossi (2018) consider only respon-
sive priorities.
In a model without priorities, Budish (2011) focuses on the eﬃciency of
the ﬁnal allocation and introduces the approximate competitive equilibrium
from equal incomes. This mechanism is eﬃcient and approximately strategy-
proof in large markets. However, unstable allocations can survive even in
large markets, maintaining the tension between eﬃciency and fairness (see
Budish and Cantillon, 2012).4 Also, the implementation of the approximate
competitive equilibrium from equal incomes is complex and computationally
intensive (see Budish et al., 2017).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
4Budish (2011) bounds absolute envy in a weak way. More precisely, student a can
envy student b if this envy can be removed by kicking student b out of at most one of
his assigned courses without altering his bundle. This weak fairness concept is compatible
with the existence of multiple blocking pairs. Consider a model in which the preferences of
the students are monotonic in the number of assigned courses, and consider any assignment
in which all students are assigned the same number of courses. This assignment satisﬁes
Budish's weak no-envy condition but can fail to eliminate justiﬁed envy.
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notation. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There are a ﬁnite set of courses C and a ﬁnite set of students S, with
C \ S = ;. Each course c has priorities over the subsets of students,
Chc. Priorities are described by a choice function Chc : 2S ! 2S, where
Chc (S
0)  S 0 for all S 0  S.5 We assume that the choice function is sub-
stitutable. Formally, if S 0  S, s; s0 2 S n S 0 and s =2 Chc (S 0 [ fsg),
then s =2 Chc (S 0 [ fs; s0g). In other words, Chc is substitutable if, when-
ever course c rejects a student from a given subset of students, it rejects her
when more students become available. We also assume that Chc satisﬁes the
irrelevance of rejected students condition.6 Formally, we assume that
if S 0  S and s =2 Chc (S 0 [ fsg), then Chc (S 0 [ fsg) = Chc (S 0). In other
words, Chc satisﬁes the irrelevance of rejected students condition if rejected
students do not aﬀect courses' choices. If Chc is substitutable and satisﬁes
the irrelevance of rejected students condition, then they are rationalizable
by a linear order on 2S, Pc, which is Chc (S 0) = maxPc fS 00 j S 00  S 0g for all
S 0  S (see Alva, 2018). A priority structure is given by ChC = (Chc)c2C
or, equivalently, by PC = (Pc)c2C , where Pc rationalizes Chc for all c 2 C. A
particular class of substitutable priorities is the class of slot-speciﬁc pri-
5Given a set X, by 2X , we denote the set of the subsets of X.
6The condition has been previously studied as irrelevance of rejected contracts in
Aygün and Sönmez (2013) for models of matching with contracts and as irrelevance of
rejected items in Alva (2018) for general choice models.
7
orities introduced by Kominers and Sönmez (2016) in a matching model
with contracts. Under slot-speciﬁc priorities, each course c 2 C has a ﬁnite
set of slots,  2 c. Each slot  has a priority order , which is a strict,
complete, and transitive binary relation over S [ f;g. The higher a student
is ranked under , the stronger the claim that she has for slot  in course
c. If ;  s, student s is not acceptable for slot . The total supply of
course c is qc = jcj. Let us deﬁne q as the vector of supply for each course
q = (q)c2C . We assume that the slots in C are ordered according to a linear
order of precedence Bc. Given two slots ; 0 2 c,  Bc 0 means that slot 
is to be ﬁlled before slot 0 whenever possible. For each course c, we assume
that slots in c are ordered in such a way that 1 Bc 2 Bc ::: Bc qc . Let
S 0  S. The choice of school c from S 0, denoted by Chc (S 0), is obtained as
follows: slots at school c are ﬁlled one at a time following the order of prece-
dence. The highest-priority acceptable student in S 0 under 1 , for example,
student s1, is chosen for slot 1 of school c; the highest-priority acceptable
student in S 0 n fs1g under 1 , for example, student s2, is chosen for slot 2
of school c, and so on. The choice function Chc satisﬁes substitutability (see
Kominers and Sönmez, 2016) and the irrelevance of rejected students condi-
tion. A slot-speciﬁc priority structure is a tuple

q;
 
c; ()2c ;Bc

c2C

.
Throughout the paper, we assume that priorities are ﬁxed, substitutable, and
satisfy the irrelevance of rejected students conditions.
Each student s 2 S has a strict preference relation Ps over the set of
subsets of C, 2C . For each C 0  C and each s 2 S, we denote by Chs (C 0)
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the choice set of student s, which is the favorite combination of courses
among the ones belonging to C 0. Formally, Chs (C 0) = maxPs fD j D  C 0g.
A subset of courses C 0  C is not acceptable to student s when ;PsC 0. We
assume that the choice set induced by each Ps is substitutable as previously
deﬁned for the case of courses' priorities. Let P be the set of substitutable
preferences on 2C . A more restrictive condition is responsiveness. We say
that Ps is responsive (see Roth 1985), with demand qs if, for each C 0 
C and for all c; c0 2 C n C 0, the following holds: (1) if jC 0j < qs, then
C 0 [ fcgPsC 0 [ fc0g if and only if fcgPs fc0g, (2) if jC 0j < qs, then C 0 [
fcgPsC 0 if and only if fcgPs;, and (3) if jC 0j > qs, then ;PsC 0.
For each S 0  S, set PS0 = (Ps)s2S0 . For each s 2 S, set P s = PSnfsg.
Given a preference relation P on 2C , the restriction of P to C 0  C; denoted
by PjC0 is a preference that ranks all subsets in 2C
0
exactly as P does and
ranks all other subsets of courses as not acceptable. Formally PjC0 is such
that, for all Q; T  C 0, QPjC0T if and only if QPT and, for all Q * C 0,
;PjC0Q.
A matching is a function  : C [ S ! 2C [ 2S such that, for each
s 2 S and each c 2 C, (s) 2 2C , (c) 2 2S and c 2  (s) if and only
if s 2  (c). The set of all matchings is denoted by M: Matching  is
individually rational for x 2 C [ S if Ch ( (x)) =  (x). Matching 
is blocked by a pair (c; s) 2 C  S if s =2  (c), c 2 Chs ( (s) [ fcg), and
s 2 Chc ( (c) [ fsg). Finally, a matching  is stable for (S;C; PS; ChC) if it
is individually rational for all x 2 C [ S and there exists no pair blocking it.
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If PS and ChC are substitutable and ChC satisﬁes the irrelevance of rejected
students conditions, then a stable matching exists (see Echenique y Oviedo,
2006).
A mechanism is a function that associates a matching to every pref-
erence proﬁle for students, P = (Ps)s2S, ' : P jSj ! M. A mechanism is
stable if ' (P ) is a stable matching for each P . A mechanism is strategy-
proof if ' (P )Rs' (P 0s; P s) for each P , s 2 S, and P 0s; where Rs denotes
the weak preferences associated to Ps. Given a priority structure ChC and
preference proﬁle P 2 P jSj, a mechanism ' induces a normal form game
G (P ) =  S;P jSj; '; P, where S is the set of players, P jSj is the strategy
space, ' is the outcome function, and P is the proﬁle of students' preferences.
Let  : P jSj M be a correspondence. We say that mechanism ' imple-
ments  in Nash equilibrium (NE from now on) if, for each P 2 P jSj,
the set of Nash equilibria of G (P) =  S;P jSj; '; P, NE (P ) coincides with
 (P ). We say that mechanism ' implements  in undominated Nash
equilibrium (UNE from now on) if, for each P 2 P jSj, the set of undom-
inated Nash equilibria of G (P) =  S;P jSj; '; P, UNE (P ) coincides with
 (P ).
3 The renegotiable acceptance mechanism
In this section, we introduce the renegotiable acceptance mechanism. The
new mechanism has characteristics of both the immediate and the deferred
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acceptance mechanisms. As in the immediate acceptance mechanism, stu-
dents are accepted by courses at most once along the mechanism. As in the
deferred acceptance mechanism, a course can replace previously accepted
students with new ones.
The message space for students in the renegotiable acceptance mechanism
is the set of preference proﬁles on the subsets of courses. In the ﬁrst stage,
only the favorite set of courses of each student is considered. Among the
students demanding a given course, the group with the highest priority is
chosen. At the end of this stage, all students assigned to at least one course
are removed, jointly with the students not demanding any course. At the
rth step of the procedure, only the rth choices of the remaining students are
considered. Each course considers the students already assigned to it and the
new students claiming a seat, and chooses the subset of highest priority. All
students who have been assigned at least one course at this stage are removed,
jointly with the students not demanding any course. The procedure stops
when all students have been removed.
Let P = (Ps)s2S be a preference proﬁle. Let s 2 S and let r be an integer
such that 1  r  2jSj, and let CrPs be the rth ranked acceptable set of courses
according to Ps, when one exists. Let CrPs be empty otherwise.
Given a priority system (Pc)c2C and a preference proﬁle for students
(Ps)s2S, the following procedure describes the renegotiable acceptance
mechanism.
Step 1: Only the top acceptable choices of students are considered. For each
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course c, let S1c be the set of students who selected c among their ﬁrst
choices. Formally, S1c =

s 2 S j c 2 C1Ps
	
. Deﬁne 1 (c) = Chc (S1c ).
Every student in 1 (c) is enrolled in course c. Every student in 1 (c)
and every student s such that C1Ps = ; is removed from the market.
Set T 1 = S. Let T 2 be the set of remaining students.
Step r, r  2: Only the rth choices of students in T r are considered. For each
course c, let Src = 
r 1 (c) [ s 2 T r j c 2 CrPs	 be the set of students
enrolled at c at the end of stage r and of the remaining students ranking
a set containing c in the rth place. Let r (c) = Chc (Src ). Every student
in r (c) and every student s such that CrPs = ; is removed from the
market. Let T r+1 be the set of remaining students.
The procedure stops when all students have been removed. Formally, it
stops at r = min fr j T r+1 = ;g. Let RA (P ) = r be the ﬁnal outcome.
Note that the procedure produces an outcome even when preferences are not
substitutable.
We ﬁrst show that in the renegotiable acceptance mechanism, students
can obtain any attainable set of courses by ranking them in the ﬁrst place.
Lemma 1 Let P = (Ps)s2S be a preference proﬁle for students, and let  =
RA (P ). If priorities are substitutable, for each s 2 S and C 0   (s),
C 0 = RA
 
PsjC0 ; P s

(s).
Proof. Let s 2 S and let C 0   (s). Let c 2 C 0, let r (c) be the step of the
renegotiable acceptance mechanism when c has been assigned to s for the ﬁrst
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time along the mechanism, and formally let r (c) = minrr fr j s 2 r (c)g.
Note that r (c) = r (c0) for all c; c0 2  (s) and that r (s) = ; for all r < r (c).
The substitutability of Chc implies that C
r(c)
Ps
PsC
0; otherwise, s 2 r (c) for
some r < r (c). For all i  r (c), let P r(c)s be a preference proﬁle over 2C
such that Cr(c)
P
r(c)
s
= C 0, and for j 6= r (c): Cr(c)
P
r(c)
s
= CjPs if C
j
Ps
6= C 0 and
Cj
P
r(c)
s
= C
r(c)
Ps
if CjPs = C
0. Note that RA

P
r(c)
s ; P s

(s) = C 0. For all i,
i < r (c), let P is be a preference proﬁle over 2
C , such that CiP is = C
0, and for
j 6= i: Cj
P js
= Cj+1Ps if C
j+1
P j+1s
6= C 0 and Cj
P js
= Cj+1
P j+1s
if Cj+1
P j+1s
= C 0. Intuitively,
each P js lifts C
0 at place j in the preference proﬁle of s without altering the
ranking above the jth place.
We prove by contradiction that RA (P i 1s ; P s) (s) = RA (P
i
s ; P s) (s) =
C 0 for all i, 1  i < r (c). For every preference proﬁle on 2C , Qs, let jQs
be the outcome at stage j of the mechanism when preferences are (Qs; P s).
Note that iPs = 
i
P js
for all i, j, 2  i < j  r (c). Thus, to prove that
RA (P i 1s ; P s) (s) = RA (P
i
s ; P s) (s) for all i < r (c), it suﬃces to show that
s 2 Chc

i 1Ps (c) [
n
s 2 S j c 2 Ss0 6=sCi 1Ps0 o [ fsg for all i, 2  i  r (c).
By contradiction, assume that it is not the case, and let j be the maximum
integer such that
s =2 Chc

j 1Ps (c) [
n
s 2 S j c 2 Ss0 6=sCi 1Ps0 o [ fsg and
s 2 Chc

jPs (c) [
n
s 2 S j c 2 Ss0 6=sCi 1Ps0 o [ fsg. Because Pc is substi-
tutable, s 2 Chc
 
jPs (c) [ fsg

. The jth step of the mechanism when pref-
erences are (P js ; P s) yields 
j
P js
(c) to course c. We have
s =2 Chc

j 1Ps (c) [
n
s 2 S j c 2 Ss0 6=sCi 1Ps0 o [ fsg = jP js (c). The irrele-
13
vance of rejected students condition implies that
Chc

j 1Ps (c) [
n
s 2 S j c 2 Ss0 6=sCi 1Ps0 o [ fsg= Chc  jPs (c) [ fsg = jPs (c).
In particular, s =2 Chc
 
jPs (c) [ fsg

, which yields a contradiction. Thus, we
have RA (P 1s ; P s) (s) = C
0. It follows that RA
 
PsjC0 ; P s

(s) = C 0, which
concludes the proof of the claim.
Lemma 1 implies that each student can obtain her favorite attainable set
of courses by listing a reduced amount of options. Thus, we can prove that
every Nash equilibrium outcome of the renegotiable acceptance mechanism
is stable, and every stable allocation is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the
renegotiable acceptance mechanism.
Theorem 1 The renegotiable acceptance mechanism implements the set of
stable matching in NE in the domain of substitutable preferences if priorities
are substitutable.
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst prove that any NE outcome is a stable matching. Let
P  be a NE of the games induced by the renegotiable acceptance mecha-
nism, and let  = RA (P ). Matching  is individually rational for each
course by deﬁnition. We prove by contradiction that  is individually ra-
tional for students. Assume Chs ( (s)) 6=  (s) for some s 2 S. Let
P 0s = PsjChs((s)). Because Ps is substitutable, P
0
s is substitutable as well. By
Lemma 1: RA
 
P 0s; P

 s

(s) = Chs ( (s)). Thus, the deviation is proﬁtable
to s, which yields a contradiction. Assume that there exists a pair blocking
, (c; s) 2 C  S. Let P 0 = PsjChs((s)[fcg). Because s 2 Chc ( (c) [ fsg),
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the deviation is proﬁtable to s, which yields a contradiction. It follows that
matching  is individually rational and cannot be blocked by any course-
student pair; thus, it is stable.
(ii) Let  be a stable matching. For each s, let P s = Psj(s). Set P
 =
(P s )s2S. We have RA (P
) = . We prove by contradiction that P  is
a Nash equilibrium. Assume that s 2 S has a proﬁtable deviation, P 0s,
and let 0 = RA
 
P 0s; P

 s

. Let c 2 Chs ( (s) [ 0 (s)) n  (s). Because
Ps is substitutable, c 2 Chs ( (s) [ fcg). Let P 00s = PsjChs((s)[fcg), then
RA
 
P 00s ; P

 s

(s) = Chs ( (s) [ fcg). It follows that (c; s) blocks , which
yields a contradiction.
The renegotiable acceptance mechanism yields unstable matchings with
respect to stated preferences. However, unstable matchings are ruled out by
strategic behavior. From Lemma 1, it follows that if pair (c; s) blocks an
outcome matching , PsjChs((s)[fcg) is a proﬁtable deviation for s.
Note that the equilibrium strategies deﬁned in part (ii) of the proof of
Theorem 1 are undominated. Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 1 The renegotiable acceptance mechanism implements the set of
stable matching in UNE in the domain of substitutable preferences if prior-
ities are substitutable.
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3.1 Slot-speciﬁc priorities
The class of slot-speciﬁc priorities is a strict subset of the set of substi-
tutable priorities that allows for a ﬂexible matching of students to courses.
Let

q;
 
c; ()2c ;Bc

c2C

be a slot-speciﬁc priority structure. Let PC =
(Pc)c2C be a proﬁle of linear orders that rationalize the respective choice func-
tions. The hypothesis of Theorem 1 are satisﬁed by slot-speciﬁc priorities.
It follows that under these priorities, the renegotiable acceptance mechanism
implements the set of stable matching in NE when students' preferences are
substitutable.
Under slot-speciﬁc priorities, we can adapt the immediate acceptance
mechanism to allocate courses, which works as follows. First, all students
submit a preference proﬁle. In the ﬁrst stage, the favorite acceptable set
of courses of each student is considered. Among the students claiming a
course, those with the highest priorities for any given course are assigned to
it. At the end of this stage, all students assigned to at least one course and
all assigned seats are removed from the procedure. At the nth stage of the
mechanism, only the nth choices of the remaining students are considered,
and we repeat the procedure until no more slots or students are remaining.
Given a priority structure (Pc)c2C and a preference proﬁle for students
(Ps)s2S, the following procedure describes the immediate acceptance mech-
anism.
 Step 1: Only the top acceptable choices of students are considered.
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For each course c, let S1c be the set of students who selected c among
their ﬁrst choices. Formally, S1c =

s 2 S j c 2 C1Ps
	
.7 Deﬁne 1 (c) =
Chc (S
1
c ). Every student in 
1 (c) is deﬁnitively enrolled in course c.
Every student in 1 (c) and every student s such that C1Ps = ; is re-
moved from the market. Set T 1 = S. Let T 2 be the set of remaining
students.
 Step r; r  2: Only the rth choices of students in T r are consid-
ered. For each course c let Src =

s 2 T r j c 2 CrPs
	
be the set of
students in T r who selected c among their rth choices. Let r (c) =
maxPc fr 1 (c) [ S 0 j S 0  Srcg. Every student in r (c) and every stu-
dent s such that CrPs = ; is removed from the market. Let T r+1 be the
set of remaining students.
The procedure stops when all students have been removed. Formally, it stops
at r = min fr j T r+1 = ;g. Let IA (P ) = r be the ﬁnal outcome. Note that
a student never loses the seat at a course she has been assigned to at some
step of the mechanism, but she can be moved to slots of diﬀerent precedence
along the mechanism. Furthermore, all matchings are individually rational
for courses.
Under substitutable preferences, all stable matchings are Nash equilib-
rium outcomes of the immediate acceptance mechanism. However, not all
Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable matchings. This is because not all
7For each i and each Ps, CiPs is deﬁned as for the renegotiable acceptance mechanism.
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outcomes of the mechanism are individually rational for courses as can be
seen in Example 1.
Example 1 There are two courses, C = fc1; c2g and four students, S =
fs1; s2; s3; s4g. Each student wants to enroll in exactly one course. The
maximal number of students c1 can enroll is three but the ideal number is
two. Preferences and priorities are as follows:
Ps1 : fc2g ; fc1g;
Ps2 : fc1g;
Ps3 : fc1g;
Ps4 : fc2g;
Pc1 : fs1; s3g ; fs1; s2; s3g ; fs2; s3g ; fs1; s2g ; fs1g ; fs3g ; fs2g;
Pc2 : fs4g ; fs1g ; fs2g ; fs3g.
All priorities are substitutable. Truth telling results in matching , where
 (c1) = fs1; s2; s3g and  (c2) = fs4g, which is not individually rational
because Chc1 ( (c1)) 6=  (c1). However, truth telling is a Nash equilibrium
of the immediate acceptance mechanism because any agent but s1 is assigned
to her preferred course, and s1 has no proﬁtable deviations.
The instability ofNE allocations comes from the fact that acceptances are
deﬁnitive. In Example 1, when s1's application comes, course c1's priorities
prescribe the rejection of the student's application, but it cannot. Unlike the
renegotiable acceptance mechanism, the immediate acceptance mechanism
does not allow for courses to reject previously accepted students.
18
When priorities are slot-speciﬁc, this is not a concern because all outcomes
of the immediate acceptance mechanism are individually rational for courses.
Even if the executions of the two mechanisms do not coincide under slot-
speciﬁc priorities, we can replicate the strategy of the proof of Theorem 1
and prove an analogous of Lemma 1: students can obtain any attainable set
of courses by ranking them in the ﬁrst place when the immediate acceptance
mechanism is employed.
Lemma 2 Let P = (Ps)s2S be a preference proﬁle for students, and let  =
IA (P ). For each s 2 S and C 0   (s) C 0 = IA  PsjC0 ; P s.
Proof. Let s 2 C and let C 0   (s) . Let c 2 C 0, let r (c) be the step of
the immediate acceptance mechanism when c has been assigned to s, and
formally let r (c) = minrr fr j s 2 r (c)g. Let  be the slot to which s is
assigned at stage r (c). Thus, student s is the highest priority student for
slot  among the ones in r (c) and who are not assigned to a slot preceding
. Formally, for each r  r (c), if s0 2 rand s0  s , there exists a slot
0 2 c, 0 Bc  such that s0 0 . Thus, C 0 = IA
 
PsjC0 ; P s

.
This result allows us to prove that every Nash equilibrium outcome of
the immediate acceptance mechanism is stable and every stable allocation is
a Nash equilibrium outcome of the immediate acceptance mechanism under
slot-speciﬁc priorities.
Theorem 2 The immediate acceptance mechanism implements the set of
stable matching in NE in the domain of substitutable preferences if priorities
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are slot-speciﬁc.
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst prove that any NE outcome is a stable matching. Let
P  be a NE of
 
S;P jSj; IA; P and let  = IA (P ). As observed,  is
individually rational for each course. We prove by contradiction that  is
individually rational for students. Assume Chs ( (s)) 6=  (s) for some s 2 S.
Let P 0s = PsjChs((s)), by Lemma 2: IA
 
P 0s; P

 s

(s) = Chs ( (s)). Thus,
the deviation is proﬁtable to s, which yields a contradiction. Assume that
there exists a pair blocking , (c; s) 2 C  S. Let P 0 = PsjChs((s)[fcg).
Because s 2 Chc ( (c) [ fsg), the deviation is proﬁtable to s, which yields a
contradiction. Because  is individually rational and cannot be blocked by
a pair,  is stable.
(ii) Let  be a stable matching. For each s, let P s = Psj(s). Set P
 =
(P s )s2S. We have IA (P
) = . We prove by contradiction that P  is
a Nash equilibrium. Assume that s 2 S has a proﬁtable deviation, P 0s,
and let 0 = IA
 
P 0s; P

 s

. Let c 2 Chs ( (s) [ 0 (s)) n  (s). Because
Ps is substitutable, c 2 Chs ( (s) [ fcg). Let P 00s = PsjChs((s)[fcg), then
IA
 
P 00s ; P

 s

(s) = Chs ( (s) [ fcg). It follows that (c; s) blocks , which
yields a contradiction.
The cost of introducing substitutable priorities is to allow for courses
to renegotiate their assigned group of students to preserve the individual
rationality of the outcome. Theorem 2 proves that this is no longer the case
under slot-speciﬁc priorities: Nash implementation of stable matchings does
not require students to lose their positions along the mechanism.
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Note that the equilibrium strategies deﬁned in the part (ii) of the proof
of Theorem 2 are undominated. Thus, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 2 The immediate acceptance mechanism implements the set of
stable matching in UNE in the domain of substitutable preferences if prior-
ities are slot-speciﬁc.
3.2 Simplifying the strategy space
The renegotiable and immediate acceptance mechanisms perform well under
substitutable and slot-speciﬁc priorities, respectively. However, the com-
plexity of the strategy space might hinder its practical implementation (see
Budish et al., 2017). We prove that if the preferences of the students are re-
sponsive, the message space can be simpliﬁed.8 Our ﬁndings can be applied
to situations in which course schedules do not overlap, and students have
only one possible group to attend to for each course. This is often the case
for the courses organized by neighborhood associations and local libraries,
and for elective courses at small community colleges and universities.
We next introduce two mechanisms derived from the renegotiable and
immediate acceptance mechanisms for which students have to reveal their
preferences for individual courses and demands, instead of their full proﬁle
of preferences for all possible subsets of courses.
For each s 2 S, let Ms = L (C) (N \ [0; jCj]), where L (C) is the set of
8As mentioned in the introduction, the assumption of responsive preferences is standard
in the course assignment literature.
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linear order on C [ f;g and N is the set of non-negative integers. For each
s 2 S, let (s; qs) 2 Ms and let Ps = Ps (s; qs) be a proﬁle of responsive
preferences with demand qs, which coincides with s on the set of individual
courses.9
Given a priority system (Chc)c2C and (s; qs)s2S, the simpliﬁed renego-
tiable acceptance mechanism is deﬁned by the following outcome function
SRA
 
(s; qs)s2S

= RA
 
Ps (s; qs)s2S

. In other words, in a simpliﬁed
mechanism, students play the game induced by the corresponding mecha-
nism with preferences that are responsive to the revealed ones.
Proposition 1 Assume that students preferences are responsive and priori-
ties are substitutable. The simpliﬁed renegotiable acceptance mechanism im-
plements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst prove that any NE outcome is a stable matching. Let
(>s; q

s)s2S be a NE of the game induced by the simpliﬁed renegotiable ac-
ceptance mechanism when students' preferences are given by (Ps)s2S and let
 = SRA
 
(>s; q

s)s2S

. Matching  is individually rational for each course.
We prove by contradiction that  is individually rational for students. As-
sume that  is not individually rational for student s 2 S, which assumes
that there exists a course c 2  (s) such that ;Psc or j (s)j > qs, where qs
is the oﬀer of course s according to Ps. Let >s be the restriction of Ps to
individual courses. By Lemma 1, (>s; qs) is a proﬁtable deviation for stu-
dent s, which yields a contradiction. We next prove by contradiction that
9This means that c s c0 if and only if fcgPs fc0g for all c; c0 2 C.
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 is not blocked by any pair. Assume that there exists a pair blocking ,
(c; s) 2 C  S. Let >s be the restriction of Ps to the individual courses in
 (s)[fcg. Because s 2 Chc ( (s) [ fcg), the deviation (>s; qs) is proﬁtable
to s, which yields a contradiction.
(ii) Let  be a stable matching. For each s, let >s be the restriction of Ps
to the individual courses in  (s). Note that (>s; qs)s2S yields  as outcome.
We prove by contradiction that (>s; qs)s2S is a Nash equilibrium. Assume
that student s has a proﬁtable deviation, (>0s; q
0
s), and let 
0 be the outcome
of such a deviation. Let c 2 Chs ( (s) [ 0 (s) ; Ps (>s; qs)) n  (s). Because
Ps is responsive, c 2 Chs ( (s) [ fcg). Let >00s be the restriction of Ps to the
individual courses of  (s) [ fcg. Then, (>0s; qs) is a proﬁtable deviation as
well, yielding Chs ( (s) [ fcg ; Ps). Thus, the pair (c; s) blocks matching ,
which yields a contradiction.
We can also deﬁne a simpliﬁed version of the immediate acceptance mech-
anism as follows. Given a priority system (Chc)c2C and (s; qs)s2S, the sim-
pliﬁed immediate acceptance mechanism is deﬁned by the following outcome
function SIA
 
(s; qs)s2S

= IA
 
Ps (s; qs)s2S

.
Proposition 2 Assume that student preferences are responsive and priori-
ties are slot-speciﬁc. The simpliﬁed immediate acceptance mechanism imple-
ments the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and is
omitted.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we present the renegotiable acceptance mechanism to allocate
courses to students on the basis of priorities. Under substitutable preferences
and priorities, the renegotiable acceptance mechanism implements the set of
stable matching in Nash equilibrium and in undominated Nash equilibrium.
The mechanism produces matchings that are fair, and its practical imple-
mentation is not computationally demanding. The renegotiable acceptance
mechanism is based on the immediate acceptance mechanism but allows for
courses to reject previously accepted students. During the procedure, courses
are only tentatively assigned, and the readjustments preserve individual ra-
tionality. This makes our new procedure a hybrid between the immediate
and the deferred acceptance mechanisms. We also analyze the immediate
acceptance mechanism under the assumption of slot-speciﬁc priorities and
ﬁnd that it implements the set of stable matching in Nash equilibrium and
in undominated Nash equilibrium. The results depend on the fact that both
mechanisms provide each student with incentive to top-rank the best achiev-
able subset of courses given the preferences submitted by the other students.
This property helps to rule out unstable matchings as equilibrium outcomes.
Finally, we study the possibility of reducing the complexity of the strategy
space. We show that this is possible when courses are not complements. In
this case, a mechanism that asks each student a ranking on individual courses
and the number of courses that she is willing to take implements the set of
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stable matchings in Nash equilibria.
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